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Introduction
THE GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE PROBLEM is enormous and
complex. To solve the problem, it is important that we have a good
grasp of the whole climate system-not only the atmosphere and the
oceans, not only the flora and the fauna, but also the human activities
that are causing the problem and the human institutions that are at-
tempting to solve the problem.
As one human institution-the United States legal system-faces
the climate problem, it must grapple with ongoing challenges in envi-
ronmental law.I How do judges without scientific backgrounds make
rulings in cases of complex environmental questions? How do the
courts make decisions in cases of uncertainty and risk? How do the
courts recognize causal connections or suggest remedies in cases of
large-scale, long-term environmental problems?
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1. In addition to examination of themes of judicial competence, judicial authority,
and standing throughout this issue of the U.S.F. Law Review, a helpful summary is provided
by JUSTIN PIDOT, GEORGETOWN ENVrL. LAW & POLICY INST., GLOBAL WARMING IN THE
COURTS: AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT LITIGATION AND COMMON LEGAL ISSUES (2006), available
at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/current-research/documents/GVALReport.
pdf.
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As environmental challenges from air toxics to acid rain have
emerged, the courts have pushed the relevant agencies to address
this. 2 When the courts have faced complex environmental questions,
they have tended to defer to the technical competence of experts. 3
When faced with uncertainty and potentially large risks to human and
ecosystem health, the courts have exercised different degrees of pre-
caution.4 And to effectively resolve large-scale, long-term environmen-
tal problems, the stepping stones of initial legal remedies have led to
more comprehensive policy.5
This Article provides context for the examination of United
States climate policy and litigation initiatives covered by other articles
in this issue of the University of San Francisco Law Review. Part I of this
Article highlights the current scientific understanding of global cli-
mate change and offers a framework to connect the many scientific
findings with the human influence on this phenomenon. Part II of
this Article then provides a synthesis of international climate initia-
tives, from international legal agreements under the United Nations
("UN"), to policies and programs outside the UN framework. Finally,
Part III of this Article presents possible solutions and emphasizes the
urgent need for action.
I. Scientific Context
A. Scientific Certainty of Climate Change
Scientific certainty about climate change is not new. Since the
1800s, scientists such as France's Fourier and Sweden's Arrhenius ex-
plained the Earth's greenhouse effect and the role that some atmos-
pheric gases-especially carbon dioxide ("C0 2") and methane
2. See, e.g., ROSEMARY O'LEARY, Environmental Policy in the Courts, in ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY: NEW DIRECrIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 151-74 (Norman Vig & Michael
Kraft eds., 5th ed. 2003).
3. See, e.g., P.F. Ricci & L.S. Molton, Risk and Benefit in Environmental Law, 214 Sci-
ENCE 1096-1100 (1981).
4. For an excellent comparative analysis of risk and the precautionary principle in
environmental law, see David Vogel, Comparing Environmental Governance: Risk Regulation in
the EU and the U.S. (Ctr. for Responsible Bus., Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Working Paper No. 2,
2003).
5. For example, litigation over local cancer clusters has led to larger policies (such as
the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976) on carcinogens, persistent organic pollutants,
and hazardous waste. For more on the role of the courts in environmental policy, see
O'LEARV, supra note 2.
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("CH 4")-play in warming our planet.6 Back in the 1890s, Arrhenius,
as well as the American scientist Chamberlain, realized that the burn-
ing of fossil fuels could lead to global warming. 7 Since the 1900s, sys-
tematic measurements of global surface temperatures and
atmospheric CO 2 concentrations have identified a remarkable increas-
ing trend, most notably in the "Keeling curve."' 8 Investigation of tem-
peratures in the more distant past, through measurement of gases
trapped in ice cores and carbon dating of corals, as tracked in Mann's
famous "hockey stick" graph, show an abnormal increase in tempera-
tures over the past fifty years that is beyond the natural variation
found in more than 1,000 years.9
What is new about scientific certainty on climate change is in-
creasing evidence to support past scientific findings. For nearly two
decades, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ("IPCC")-
composed of experts from around the world-has been assessing the
understanding of the climate change problem. 10 Through a formal
process of review involving national governments as well as climate
experts, the IPCC has issued four assessment reports. In 1995, the Sec-
ond Assessment Report carefully worded its conclusion: "The balance
of evidence suggests a discernible human influence on global cli-
mate."" Even this cautious statement evoked sharp reactions from
those reluctant to acknowledge the climate change problem. In the
Third Assessment Report of 2001, the IPCC strengthened its language
and made it more specific: "there is new and stronger evidence that
most of the warming observed over the last 50 years is attributable to
6. For further information on the history of climate change science, see INTERGOV-
ERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE ("IPCC"), CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL
SCIENCE BASIS (forthcoming Oct. 2007) (on file with the author).
7. Id.
8. The "Keeling curve" refers to high-precision measurements of atmospheric CO 2
concentrations taken by Dr. David Keeling, of Scripps Institute of Oceanography, from an
observatory atop Mauna Loa on the island of Hawaii. See Welcome to Scripps C0 2, http://
scrippsco2.ucsd.edu/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2007).
9. Numerous studies have supported the findings of Mann's temperature record. For
an authoritative discussion by actual climate scientists, see Realclimate.org, Myth vs. Fact
Regarding the "Hockey Stick" (Dec. 4, 2004), http://www.realclimate.org/index.php?p=
11.
10. For more information on the founding of IPCC, see IPCC, About IPCC, http://
www.ipcc.ch/about/about.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2007).
11. IPCC, WORKING GROUP I, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE
(1995) [hereinafter IPCC WGI, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995].
Summer 2007]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
human activities."'12 By 2007, the Fourth Assessment Report left no
doubt and stated: "warming of the climate system is unequivocal."1 3
In the 2007 Fourth Assessment Report, the IPCC made considera-
ble effort to provide decision makers with further information about
the strength of their findings. 14 To do this, the IPCC sought to quan-
tify the degree of certainty on expert findings, by calculating confi-
dence intervals and by using consistent language to describe the level
of confidence. For example, the IPCC used the language "very high
confidence" or "very likely" to express a level of certainty of ninety
percent or greater.1 5 IPCC used the language "very likely" to convey
that climate experts around the world are more than ninety percent
certain that human emissions of greenhouse gases are the cause of
observed global warming.1 6
By better quantifying and communicating scientific certainty, the
IPCC clarified misconceptions or misrepresentations about agree-
ment among the majority of climate experts. Misrepresentation has
been especially problematic in the United States. Lack of media cover-
age on climate change has left the public unaware of the extent of the
problem.' 7 False journalistic balance-where the media presents un-
supported conjectures of individuals on the same footing as the rigor-
ous findings of hundreds of experts based on years of research-has
confused both the public and policy makers. 18 Perhaps most blatant
12. IPCC, WORKING GROUP I, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS (2001),
available at http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc-tar/wgl/index.htm.
13. IPCC, WORKING GROUP I, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENTIFIC BASIS -
SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS (S. Solomon et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter IPCC WG1, SUM-
MARY FOR POLICYMAKERS], available at http://ipcc-wgl.ucar.edu/wgl/wgl-report.html (fol-
low "Summary for Policymakers" hyperlink).
14. The Fourth Assessment Report incorporated four "cross-cutting themes," one of
which was better quantification and communication of risk and uncertainty. See Martin
Manning & Michel Petit, A Concept Paper for the AR4 Cross Cutting Theme: Uncertainties and
Risk, IPCC (2003), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/activity/cctl.pdf.
15. In the 2007 Fourth Assessment Report, each Summary for Policymakers ("SPM")
from the three Working Groups of the IPCC provides definitions of levels of confidence
and highlights the language used to describe scientific certainty.
16. IPCC WG1, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 13.
17. For example, European media coverage of the 2003 heat wave in Europe empha-
sized the connection between the heat wave and human-induced climate change. In con-
trast, mainstream news media in the United States hesitated to mention any connection
between climate change and severe weather events, notably the hurricane season of 2005.
18. A remarkable example of this was the invitation of novelist Michael Crichton (au-
thor of the fictional novel, A State of Fear) to give congressional testimony rather than cli-
mate experts. The Role of Science in Environmental Policy-Making: Hearing Before the Committee
on Environment and Public Works, 109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of Michael Crichton, au-
thor), available at http://epw.senate.gov/public/hearing-statements.cfm?id=246766.
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and disturbing has been political tampering with scientific findings,
including White House staff deleting text and re-writing scientific re-
ports, or attempts to gag scientists at government agencies when they
communicate their findings in presentations or written reports. 19 In
contrast, the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report presents the conclusions
of more than 2500 scientific expert reviewers, over 800 contributing
authors, and 450 lead authors from more than 130 countries around
the world, after six years of current work.20
Four main conclusions were conveyed in the authoritative IPCC
Fourth Assessment Report: (1) the climate system is warming, (2) cli-
mate change is human-induced, (3) climate change impacts are hap-
pening now, and (4) climate change solutions are available and
needed now. 21
1. The Climate System Is Warming
Based on direct and indirect measurements of temperature
around the globe, scientists have found that the warming of the
Earth's climate is "unequivocal."22 Observations of temperatures on
the land surface, on the ocean surface and below, and at different
heights in the atmosphere show that the average global temperature is
increasing.23 Greater trapping of incoming solar radiation by higher
levels of greenhouse gases in the upper atmosphere is causing the
19. See UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY IN POLICYMAKING: INVES-
TIGATION OF BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S ABUSE OF SCIENCE (2004), available at http://www.
ucsusa.org/scientific-integrity/interference/scientific-integrity-in-policy-making-204.html
(follow "Read the full report" hyperlink) (documenting abuses of science under the
current Bush administration); see also Union of Concerned Scientists, The A to Z
Guide of Political Interference in Science, http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific-integrity/
interference/a-to-z-guide-to-political.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2007).
20. IPCC WG1, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 13.
21. These four main conclusions of the IPCC 2007 Fourth Assessment Report are the
author's synthesis, based on the Summary for Policymakers from the three Working
Groups of the IPCC. See IPCC WG1, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 13; IPCC,
WORKING GROUP II, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY -
SUMMARY FOR POLlCYMAKERS (2007) [hereinafter IPCC WG2, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS],
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/SPM13apr07.pdf; IPCC, WORKING GROUP III, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE - SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS (2007) [here-
inafter IPCC WG3, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMA ERS], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/
SPM040507.pdf.
22. IPCC WG1, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 13.
23. Incorrect analysis of satellite data and weather balloon data led some climate
scientists to say that the lower atmosphere was cooling, not warming. However, this asser-
tion was not supported by any physical explanation and was inconsistent with other obser-
vations and models. Subsequent analysis of the satellite data by other research groups
showed that so-called cooling was spurious and that drifting of satellite orbits accounted
for the erroneous assertion. See, e.g., Benjamin D. Santer et al., Amplification of Surface Tem-
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land surface to heat up.24 The ocean layers are also showing warming,
with surface heat slowly penetrating into deeper levels, weakening
some ocean currents and conveying more heat in cyclical phenomena
like El Nifio events. 25 Higher temperatures at the Earth's surface are
causing changes in the height of atmospheric layers, like some giant
caf6 latte; the height of the lowest layer (the stratosphere) has risen,
while the layer above (the stratosphere) has cooled. Further investiga-
tion into climatic change is now showing changes in circulation pat-
terns and hurricane intensity due to global warming, as well as
changes in the water vapor content of the atmosphere.
26
2. Climate Change Is Human-Induced
Even if we recognize that the globe is warming, how do we know
that humans are causing the phenomenon? Through a combination
of measurements and models, we can discern the human "fingerprint"
on the climate system in a number of ways. 27 First, the observed warm-
ing goes well beyond natural variation. Paleoclimatology-the sleuth-
ing for indicators of past temperatures in ice cores and coral reefs-
indicates that current levels of CO 2 in the atmosphere far exceed the
natural range of the last 650,000 years.28 We know that atmospheric
concentrations of CO 2 and temperature are strongly correlated, ex-
plaining why temperature levels are higher than ever before. 29 Sec-
ond, the rapid increase in levels of CO 2 in the atmosphere coincides
with the onslaught of the industrial revolution and the release of CO2
from fossil fuels, along with dramatic changes in land use by
humans. 30 Third, models of the climate system with and without
human emissions show that natural variation alone cannot explain ob-
perature Trends and Variability in the Tropical Atmosphere, 309 SCIENCE 1551-56 (2005); see also
Et Tu LT?, REALCLIMATE, Aug. 11 2005, http://www.realclimate.org/index.php?p=170.
24. IPCC WGI, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 13.
25. T.P. Barnett et al., Penetration of Human-Induced Warming into the World's Oceans, 309
SCIENCE 284-87 (2005).
26. See, e.g., News Release, Univ. Corp. for Atmospheric Research, Human Activities
Are Boosting Ocean Temperatures in Areas Where Hurricanes Form, New Study Finds
(Sept. 11, 2006), http://www.ucar.edu/news/releases/2006/oceantemps.shtml.
27. See Union of Concerned Scientists, Global Warming 101: Human Fingerprints,
http://www.ucsusa.org/global-warming/science/Fingerprints.html (last visited Aug. 10,
2007) [hereinafter Union of Concerned Scientists, Global Warming 101] (summarizing
the human "fingerprint" on different aspects of the climate system).
28. IPCC WG1, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 13.
29. Eric Steig, The Lag Between Temperature and C02 (Gore's Got It Right), REALCLIMATE,
Apr. 27, 2007, http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2007/04/the-lag-between-
temp-and-co2/.
30. See id.
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served changes. 31 Natural fluctuations in the Earth's orbit, natural va-
riation in solar activity, and other non-human phenomena cannot
account for the rapid rise in atmospheric greenhouse gases and aver-
age temperature over the past century. Human activity does explain
the observed changes.
3. Climate Impacts Are Happening Now
Another way we know that climate change is real is that harmful
impacts are already happening and increasing. While it is still difficult
to predict in great detail precisely where and when impacts will occur,
these observed impacts are consistent with our physical, chemical, and
ecological understanding of the climate system. Perhaps the climate
change impact most familiar to the general public is the melting of
glaciers and polar ice-dramatic pictures of huge Antarctic ice sheets
breaking off into the ocean, and polar bears stranded and drowning
for lack of Arctic sea ice. Deadly heat waves and hurricanes, intensi-
fied by climate change, have also made the news. 32 Many other im-
pacts are occurring as well across the globe.33 Global warming is
causing more rapid melting of snow packs, resulting in both flooding
and freshwater shortages. 34 Drought and desertification is intensifying
in many regions-from the usually lush Amazon Basin to chronically
dry regions of India and Africa. 35 This drying is adversely affecting
human food supply (both crops and livestock), as well as interrupting
other food chains.3 6 The combination of increased ocean tempera-
tures and acidity has already led to the death of one-third of the
word's coral reefs. 37
The above-mentioned impacts are already happening, and pre-
dictions show impacts increasing in more regions and intensifying. 38
Because our main greenhouse gas of concern, C0 2, can linger in the
atmosphere for hundreds of years after being emitted,39 our past
31. Union of Concerned Scientists, Global Warming 101, supra note 27.
32. See id.
33. IPCC WG2, SuMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 21.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. Seaworld, Coral Reefs, http://www.seaworld.org/animal-info/Animal-Bytes/
animalia/eumetazoa/radiata/cnidaria/coral-reefshtm (last visited Sept. 11, 2007).
38. Andrew C. Revkin, U.N. Study Shows Likely Impact of Global Warming, N. Y. TIMES,
Apr. 4, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/04/science/earth/O4cnd-climate.html?
ex=1333339200&en=5a60838ec16b03f6&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss.
39. Unlike atmospheric pollutants that may be "washed out" from the atmosphere
within days or months, CO 2 is removed slowly as part of the Earth's carbon cycle. Biological
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emissions have already locked in some climate impacts. But just as we
have caused the problem, we can also solve it-by reducing emissions
and preventing further impacts of human-induced climate change.
4. Climate Change Solutions Are Available and Needed Now
Another key message of the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report is
the urgency of taking action now. 40 The sooner we begin significant
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, the less we will suffer from
adverse impacts. Means of taking action are available now, in the form
of more efficient electrical appliances, more efficient industrial
processes, greater use of public transportation, vehicles with better
fuel economy, and zero-carbon energy sources like wind and solar
power. To achieve even more significant emission reductions, we must
strengthen research and development of new energy technologies.
But new technology alone cannot avert devastating climate change.
We also need changes in our economic system: phase out of fossil fuel
subsidies, economic incentives for low- and no-carbon products and
activities, and economic penalties for those activities that harm the
long-term well-being of the planet's hospitable climate. At the same
time, we must also face the damage already done and adapt to climate
impacts already occurring.
B. A Framework for Understanding Human Influence on the
Climate System
To make sense of the many pieces of information-from green-
house gas emissions to rising temperatures to melting polar ice-Fig-
ure 1 offers a simple flow diagram of the climate system, including the
human component. More commonly, we are shown schematics of the
Earth's carbon cycle, 41 or we are shown images of the greenhouse ef-
and chemical processes on land and in the oceans can take hundreds of years to remove
some CO 2 from the atmosphere. More CO 2 can be removed by geologic processes that take
hundreds of thousands of years. One of the first models on the fate of CO 2 from fossil fuels
came from T.M.L. Wigley, Balancing the Carbon Budget: Implications for Projections of Future
Carbon Dioxide Concentration Changes, 45 TELLUS 409-25 (1993). A summary of this and
more recent studies, and a helpful graphical portrayal of CO 2 residence time in this atmos-
phere, can be found at GlobalWarmingArt.com, http://www.globalwarmingart.com/wiki/
Image:CarbonDioxideResidenceTime-png (last visited Aug. 10, 2007).
40. IPCC WG3, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 21.
41. See, e.g., NASA Earth Observatory, The Carbon Cycle, http://earthobservatory.
nasa.gov/Library/CarbonCycle/carbon-cycle4.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2007) (showing a
flow diagram of the Earth's carbon cycle).
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fect and the Earth's heat balance. 4 2 The flow diagram in Figure 1
seeks to connect the science (physical, chemical, and ecological) of
the climate system with the human causes of the problem and the
human responses. From a legal perspective, Figure 1 may be a useful
reference of causal chains. From a policy perspective, it illuminates
the points in the system where policies can intervene to lessen or pre-
vent harmful impacts.
Figure 1. A Framework for Understanding Human Influence
on the Climate System
IncreasedEMISSIONS Greater heat trapping and global
of greenhouse TEMPERATURE
gases INCREASE (AT)
(ENERGY, LAND USE)
Source: Author
IMPACTS
(sea level nise, severe weather
events, ecosystem disruption)
..and ADAPTATION to
impacts
In essence, we can follow the human influence on the climate
system through the following main components: (1) human activities
involving energy and land use, (2) increased emissions of greenhouse
gases from human activities, (3) rising concentration of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere, (4) greater heat trapping (radiative forcing)
and rising average global temperature, (5) impacts on humans and
ecosystems, (6) adaptation to impacts, and (7) mitigation opportuni-
ties to reduce emissions and prevent impacts.
In the following section, this Article will illustrate the connections
among these interdependent components. Taking a solutions-ori-
ented view, we begin with observations of the problem and work back
42. IPCC WGI, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995, supra note 11 (depicting the Earth's heat bal-
ance and the greenhouse effect).
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(counter-clockwise in Figure 1) to the sources and solutions to the
problem. This solutions-oriented presentation follows the organiza-
tion in the Stem Review on the Economics of Climate Change ('Stern
Review") .43
1. Climate Impacts and Global Temperature Change
A temperature rise of a few degrees does not seem that worri-
some; we experience larger fluctuations in a single day in a single loca-
tion. But a few degrees increase in the global average temperature is
troubling, resulting in: higher high temperatures, nights that do not
cool off, hotter summers, and winters that are not cold enough to
generate much snow or to keep glaciers intact. Compared to pre-in-
dustrial times, before humans rapidly extracted large amounts of car-
bon from the bowels of the Earth and released them into the
atmosphere, the planet has experienced a global average temperature
increase of roughly 1 C.4 4 We are already experiencing the impacts of
that warming.
As climate models predict, impacts will increase as global temper-
ature increases. For example, we know that species have already
shifted their ranges toward the poles and higher up into hills and
mountains over the past several decades. 45 If the increase in global
average temperature exceeds 1.5 to 2.5'C (-3 to -5' F) relative to the
recent average temperature, up to thirty percent of plant and animal
species are projected to face extinction. 46 A similar increase in tem-
perature would also lead to freshwater shortages for billions of people,
as well as decline in food production in lower latitudes. 47 A slightly
higher temperature increase of just 2 to 3C (from present levels)
would lead to expanded wildfires and the widespread death of coral
reef systems around the world's oceans. 48
Scientists' ability to make better predictions at smaller scales-for
example, at the scale of a region or an individual state-has been im-
43. SIR NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2006),
available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/independent reviews/stern-revieweconomics
_climatechange/stemreviewindex.cfm (including full report, summaries, commentary,
presentation files, and post-release analysis).
44. To be precise, global average temperature has risen 0.8°C since the time period
1850-1899 (the onset of the industrial revolution). See IPCC WG2, SUMMARY FOR POLICY-
MAKERS, supra note 21; see also Union of Concerned Scientists, Global Warming 101, supra
note 27.
45. IPCC WG2, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 21.
46. See zd.
47. See id.
48. See id.
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proving. This ability to model at smaller scales is powerful, as it makes
the issue more compelling to local decision makers and communities.
Whereas discussion of global averages often elicits little response from
local politicians or bureaucrats, models showing severe water
shortages in California 49 lead local water agencies to put climate
change planning on their agenda.
2. Global Temperature Change and Greenhouse Gas
Concentrations
How much CO 2 (or other greenhouse gas) in the atmosphere will
lead to the global temperature increases and impacts noted above?
The relationship between greenhouse gas concentrations and global
temperature changes is referred to as the sensitivity of the climate sys-
tem. 50 Rough estimates of climate sensitivity made by Arrhenius over
a century ago have largely held true; the increase in atmospheric con-
centrations of greenhouse gases matches the observed temperature
increases. 5 1
The carbon cycle is complex, however, and different processes
that take up and release carbon work at different rates. As an added
twist, the rates of those processes-like the speed with which the
ocean absorbs C0 2, or the growth rate of terrestrial plants that take in
C0 2-are affected by temperature. 52 So as scientists make projections
based on concentration levels until now unknown on the planet, the
possibility of dramatic departures from past behavior increases. For
that reason, scientists present projections of changes in temperature
(and in other variables, like water vapor) as likely ranges of values,
rather than a single estimate.
49. Two key reports have analyzed potential climate impacts in California: (1) CAL.
CLIMATE CHANGE CTR., OUR CHANGING CLIMATE: ASSESSING THE RISKS TO CALIFORNIA
(2006), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2006publications/CEC-500-2006-077/CEC-
500-2006-077.PDF; and (2) Katharine Hayhoe et al., Emissions Pathways, Climate Change, and
Impacts on California, 101 PNAS 12,422-12,427 (2004), available at http://www.pnas.org/
cgi/reprint/101/34/12422.
50. An oft-cited measure of climate sensitivity is the change in global mean surface
temperature resulting from a doubling of the atmospheric concentration of CO 2 (includ-
ing the CO2 equivalents of other greenhouse gases). The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report
estimates this value to be in the range of 2 to 4.5°C, with a best estimate of about 3'C. IPCC
WG1, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKRS, supra note 13, at 12.
51. Arrhenius estimated a 2°C average temperature increase for a doubling of atmos-
pheric CO2 . For a summary of Arrhenius's prediction and current estimates of warming
related to CO 2 doubling, see Univ. of Cal., S.D., Earth Guide, Global Warming: The Rise of
CO 2 & Warming, http://earthguide.ucsd.edu/globalchange/global-warming/03.html
(last visited Aug. 11, 2007).
52. See IPCC WG2, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 21.
Summer 2007]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
Considering the dangers of global warming noted above, many
climate policy analysts advocate for limiting the average temperature
increase to 2 0C.53 This temperature increase roughly corresponds to
stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of CO 2 at 450 parts per million
("ppm").54 For example, a highly recommended climate stabilization
scenario from the IPCC uses a 450 ppm target, as does the 2006 Sand-
ers-Boxer-Waxman bill in the United States Senate.
55
3. Atmospheric Concentrations and Emissions of Greenhouse
Gases
Working our way further around Figure 1, to the source of the
climate change problem, we can determine a level of greenhouse gas
emissions that would limit atmospheric CO 2 concentration to 450
ppm. At this point, we face a sobering realization: to avoid dangerous
climate impacts, we need to dramatically reduce emissions as much as
sixty to eighty percent from current levels.56 In order to reach a 450
ppm target, emissions must first slow their pace of increase and peak,
then decline and level off. For example, both IPCC and the Stern Re-
view analyze an emission pathway to climate stabilization at 450 ppm,
from the year 2000 to the year 2100. From an initial level of forty-two
Gt CO 2 equivalent per year ("Gt CO2eq/yr"), emissions peak at forty-
five Gt COeq/yr shortly after 2010. 5 7 Emissions then decline steeply
53. The increase is 2°C relative to pre-industrial times. Presentation materials from
the Stern Review illustrate the relationship between atmospheric CO 2 concentration and
temperature rise. STERN, supra note 43.
54. See IPCC WG1, Summary for Policymakers, supra note 13.
55. See Manik Roy, Dir. of Cong. Affairs, Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, U.S.
Climate Policy: Where to from here?, Presentation at the University of California, Berkeley
Conference on Cap and Trade: Design and Implementation (Feb. 22, 2007), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/centers/envirolaw/capandtrade/speakers/PDFs/Roy%20
presentation.pdf (summarizing CO 2 stabilization targets proposed in United States federal
policy); see also IPCC, SPECIAL REPORT ON EMISSIONS SCENARIOS (2000), available at http://
www.grida.no/climate/ipcc/emission/ (providing information on IPCC scenarios).
56. STERN, supra note 43, at vii, available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/3/
2/Summary-ofConclusions.pdf.
57. The term "CO 2 equivalent" refers to the fact that different greenhouse gases take
up different amounts of heat (infrared radiation), based on their molecular structure. For
example, methane causes twenty-one times more warming than C0 2, so one metric ton of
methane equals twenty-one metric tons of CO 2 equivalents. The IPCC Second Assessment
Report is the primary reference on global warming potential and CO 2 equivalents. For the
full report, see IPCC, SECOND ASSESSMENT, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995 (1995), available at http:/
/www.ipcc.ch/pub/sa(E).pdf. See also U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency Non-CO 2 Gases and Carbon
Sequestration-Conversion Units, http://www.epa.gov/nonco2/units.html (last visited
Aug. 10, 2007) (summarizing conversion factors among greenhouse gases and between
CO2 equivalents and carbon equivalents).
[Vol. 42
SCIENTIFIC AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
over the next twenty-five years to approximately twenty-five Gt CO2eq/
yr by 2025, and then slowly approach nine Gt COzeq/yr by the year
2100.
There are numerous estimates of emission pathways to climate
stabilization; IPCC presents pathways for six scenarios, most of which
show higher emissions levels yielding an atmospheric CO 2 concentra-
tion higher than 450 ppm. While some may argue that an eighty per-
cent reduction in emissions is difficult to achieve, the alternative is
even less appealing. Stabilizing at a CO 2 concentration above 450 ppm
means that the global average temperature would increase more than
2'C, which in turn would result in rather severe impacts: several me-
ters of sea level rise, millions of people flooded out of coastal areas
while inland areas suffer drought and wildfires, and cholera outbreaks
due to warmer water temperatures. While different analysts have quib-
bled about the timing of the peak, the urgency of beginning the
downturn in emissions is now widely recognized.
4. Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Human Activities: Energy and
Land Use
Where do greenhouse gas emissions come from? Worldwide, the
majority (sixty-five percent) of greenhouse gases generated by human
activities are energy-related: electric power, transportation, industry,
buildings, and other energy-related emissions. Table 1 summarizes
emission shares, based on metric tons of CO 2 equivalent.5 8 CO 2 is the
main energy-related greenhouse gas, resulting from combustion of
fossil fuels: coal, oil, and natural gas.59 Energy-related processes also
emit methane; two examples are leaks in gas pipelines and releases
from coalmines where pockets of gas (coal-bed methane) are dis-
turbed during mining.60 Because methane has a global warming po-
tential twenty-one times that of C0 2, activities emitting methane
garner a proportionally larger share than those emitting C0 2 .61
The remainder of emissions (thirty-five percent) come from
human land use, land use changes, and forestry, as well as from indus-
trial and municipal waste. Land use and land use changes include ur-
banization, related expansion of transportation corridors,
58. See Table 1, infra Part I.B.4.
59. See Energy Info. Admin. ("EIA"), Greenhouse Gases, Climate Change, and Energy,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/I605/ggccebro/chapter1. html (last visited Aug. 11, 2007).
60. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Methane: Sources and Emissions, http://www.epa.
gov/methane/sources.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2007) [hereinafter EPA, Methane].
61. See Table 1 znfta Part I.B.4.
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deforestation, agriculture, and the raising of livestock. 62 Some of these
activities release CO 2, such as burning to clear agricultural land and
other deforestation. Other activities release methane; collectively, "bo-
vine burps," from ruminant herds raised for human consumption of
meat, release significant amounts of methane. 63 Industrial and munic-
ipal waste releases methane and other greenhouse gases; methane
from biological processes in wastewater treatment is one example.
64
Table 1. Global Shares of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, by
Sector 65
Sector Share (%)
energy emissions 65%
electric power 24%
Transportation 14%
Industry 14%
Buildings 8%
other energy 5%
non-energy emissions 35%
land use 18%
Agriculture 14%
Waste 3%
Source: Stern Review, based on data from WRI
and IEA
5. Preventing and Responding to Climate Change: Mitigation and
Adaptation
One significant characteristic of the sectoral emissions data in Ta-
ble 1 is that sources of greenhouse gas emissions are widespread, en-
compassing multiple sectors of human activity. While targeting the
electric-power sector can effectively address some environmental
62. See EPA, Methane, supra note 60.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Global sectoral shares of greenhouse gas emissions in Table 1 are from the Stern
Review. STERN, supra note 43, at 171, available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/3/
2/Chapter_7_Projectingthe Growth ofGreenhouse-Gas_Emissions.pdf. Note that Table
1 gives data on multiple greenhouse gases, whereas other references may present sectoral
shares of CO 2 emissions only, resulting in different numbers. Also note that the Stern Review
offers but one view of attributing emission sources. Others attribute more energy use to
buildings (from heating, cooling, lighting, appliances, etc.). See, e.g., Edward Mazria, It's the
Architecture, Stupid! Who Really Holds the Key to the Global Thermostat?, SoLAR TODAY, May-June
2003, at 48-51.
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problems, such as acid rain, attempting to address climate change re-
quires more. All of the sectors generating greenhouse gas emissions
must undertake reductions to bring emissions to a sustainable level.
Individual sectors that are significant contributors to the problem can
contribute significantly towards remedying the problem.
Thus we come full circle in Figure 1. As with the old adage "what
goes round, comes round," the human activities that generate climate-
warming gases are impacted by that same warming. Energy-intensive
air conditioners must work harder to cool hotter air, using more en-
ergy and exacerbating the warming in the process. 66 However, what
goes round does not necessarily come round just to the people who
caused the problem. Those who have not caused the problem-the
world's poorest people, living on marginal land-may be the hardest
hit by climate impacts. The poorest will have to adapt to climate im-
pacts: shifting to higher ground, rationing already limited water, fac-
ing the dwindling of meager food supplies, and suffering further from
disease. The large emitters must curb their generation of greenhouse
gases to mitigate further impacts and adapt to the impacts they have
already caused.
The urgent need to both adapt and mitigate climate change chal-
lenges us to quickly move beyond discussions of the Earth's tempera-
ture record and the compelling evidence for human-induced climate
change, and into a discussion on developing and implementing
solutions.
H. International Context
While scientists have been concerned about climate change for
more than a century, it was the first World Climate Conference in
1979 that gave significant international attention to the matter.67
Since then, international efforts have developed under the auspices of
the UN, and through other international channels outside the UN.
Despite important contributions from its own climate experts, the
United States as a nation has been slower than others in coming to
66. This type of reinforcement is an example of a problematic feedback loop. Techni-
cally speaking, this is termed "positive feedback," but in the case of adverse climate impacts
"positive" does not mean "good." Rather, we would be fortunate to find opportunities for
"negative feedback," meaning feedback that calms or dampens or corrects the adverse ef-
fects of climate change.
67. UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CARING FOR CLI-
MATE: A GUIDE TO THE CLIMATE CHANGE CONVENTION AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL (rev. ed.
2005) [hereinafter UNFCCC, CARING FOR CLIMATE], available at http://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/ publications/ caring2005-en.pdf.
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grips with the climate change problem. As a result, other nations have
taken the lead in forging international solutions. The discussion be-
low highlights important features of international agreements on cli-
mate change, along with current developments, as context for the
United States initiatives now underway.
A. International Climate Change Agreements Under the United
Nations
1. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
Recognizing the significance of current and projected climate
change, most nations of the world became signatories to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ("UNFCCC" or
"the Convention") in 1992.68 The Convention signaled international
recognition and attention to the climate change problem and estab-
lished an institutional structure for working on the problem. The
goals and desired actions of the Convention are summarized well in
Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC:
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of
present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of eq-
uity and in accordance with their common but differentiated re-
sponsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the
developed country Parties should take the lead in combating cli-
mate change and the adverse effects thereof.69
The Convention reflected the precautionary principle of protect-
ing the climate in consideration of "present and future generations,"
in line with the ideas promulgated by the earlier Brundtland Commis-
sion. 70 The theme of "common but differentiated responsibilities" was
a way to reconcile the many different interests of the world's nations.
Recognizing that developed countries had emitted the bulk of global
warming emissions past and present, and that those countries had the
most resources to resolve the problem, the Convention called on de-
veloped countries to "take the lead. '71 The developed countries are
noted in Annex I of the Convention. 7 2
68. UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONvENTiON ON CLIMATE CHANGE, May 9, 1992, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC], available at http://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.
69. Id. at 4.
70. See U.N. WORLD COMM'N ON EN-VT. AND DEv., THE BRUNDTLAND REPORT ("OUR
COMMON FUTURE") (1987).
71. UNFCCC, supra note 68, at 4.
72. "Developed countries" in Annex I of the Convention are mainly wealthy industri-
alized countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, or
OECD. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Member Countries, http://www.oecd.org/
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Signing of the Convention was just the first step in the process.
Signatory nations had to then go back to their national governments
to gain ratification before the Convention could enter into force.
Even after signing the agreement, nations still needed to work out
many details on how the Convention would function and how its goals
were to be achieved. Since entering into force in 1994, the Conven-
tion annually convenes a meeting, or Conference of the Parties
("COP"), which provides a forum for further climate change negotia-
tions. When nations later signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocol, they
convened an annual Meeting of the Parties ("MOP") of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol. Table 2 highlights these and other developments in a timeline
of events related to the UNFCCC. Significant United States involve-
ment in the Convention initiatives are noted as well.
Table 2. A Timeline of Key Events in the International
Response to Climate Change: UNFCCC Initiatives73 and
United States Involvement7 4
Year Event
1988 e IPCC established by the World Meteorological Organization
("WMO")
1990 * Second World Climate Conference and IPCC calls for global
treaty
* Initial negotiations on a framework convention under the UN
General Assembly
1992 * Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro: over 180 nations of the world
become signatories to the UNFCCC
* United States among the signatories and subsequently ratifies the
UNFCCC, with the support of President G. H. W. Bush
1994 * UNFCCC enters into force
1995 * COPI Berlin Mandate: Specified the need for greenhouse gas
reduction targets for Annex I countries and set a 1997 deadline
for determining targets
* Berlin Mandate supported by United States President Clinton
* IPCC Second Assessment Report
countrieslist/0,3351,en_33873108_33844430_1_1_1 1 l,00.html (last visited Aug. 11,
2007).
73. See UNFCCC, CARING FOR CLIMATE, supra note 67; UNFCCC, HANDBOOK (2006),
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/handbook.pdf, UNFCCC, COP
1-11 DECISIONS (2006).
74. Roy, supra note 55.
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1997 e COP3 Kyoto Protocol: Set binding emission reduction targets for
Annex I countries, including the United States
e President Clinton supports Kyoto Protocol, but no legislation
advances
* United States Senatepasses Byrd-Hagel Resolution 75 against the
Berlin Mandate by a vote of 95-0
1998 * COP4 Buenos Aires Plan of Action: Established deadlines for
finalizing work on the Kyoto Mechanisms (Joint Implementation,
Emissions Trading, and the Clean Development Mechanism),
compliance issues and policies and measures
* United States Congress remains opposed to international climate
agreements and to domestic action
2000 * COP6: Talks break down in The Hague, Netherlands
2001 * COP6 resumed; Bonn Agreements: Established less strict compli-
ance standards for the Kyoto Protocol to encourage ratification
* COP7 Marrakesh Accords: Detailed rules for implementation of
the Kyoto Protocol
* IPCC Third Assessment Report
e Change in United States Administration; President G. W. Bush
opposes the Kyoto Protocol, reneges on domestic pledge to cap
electric power plant emissions
2002 * COP8 Delhi Declaration: Took out requirements for developing
countries to cut greenhouse gas emissions due to opposition
from countries like China and India
2004 * COP10 Buenos Aires Programme of Work on Adaptation and
Response Measures: Produced a modest new program on adapta-
tion and response measures to climate change
2005 e Kyoto Protocol enters into force, following ratification by Russia
* United States and Australia are the only Annex I countries fail-
ing to make commitments under the agreement
e COPlI/MOPI (Montreal): Agreement to "dialogue on long-term
cooperative action"7 6
* United States launches six-nation Asia-Pacific Partnership on
Clean Development and Climate along with Australia, Japan,
South Korea, China, and India
* G8 Gleneagles Plan of Action: Emphasized the need for industri-
alized countries to assist developing countries
75. The resolution stated that the United States would not be a signatory to any proto-
col or agreement regarding the UNFCCC, unless the protocol or agreement required de-
veloping countries (like Annex I countries) to limit or reduce greenhouse gases. S. Res. 98,
105th Cong. (1997), available at http://www.nationalcenter.org/KyotoSenate.html.
76. UNFCCC, Dialogue on Long-term Cooperative Action to Address Climate Change
by Enhancing Implementation of the Convention, Decision 1/CP.11 (2005) [hereinafter
UNFCCC, Diaglogue], available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop-lI/application/
pdf/cop1 1-00-dialogue-on long-term-coop-action.pdf.
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2006 * COP12/MOP2 Nairobi Declaration: aimed at creating sustainable
development in Africa
0 United States Senate passes Lugar-Biden Resolution, 77 urging
United States re-engagement in international negotiations under
the UNFCCC
2007 * COP13/MOP3 scheduled for Bali, Indonesia
* IPCC Fourth Assessment Report
* Changes in United States Congress lead to the introduction of
several pieces of national climate legislation
* Group of 8 Industrialized Nations ("G8") pushes for fifty percent
reduction in emissions by 2050, but proposes no specific commit-
ments
2. Structure of the Kyoto Protocol
Recognizing the strong connection between impacts, warming,
concentrations, and emissions of greenhouse gases (as shown in Fig-
ure 1),78 the 1997 Kyoto Protocol ("Protocol") focused its attention
on reducing emissions. 79 The Protocol called for industrialized coun-
tries to make binding commitments to reduce emissions, consistent
with the Protocol's foundation of "common but differentiated respon-
sibilities."80 Emission reductions in developing countries were to be
encouraged through technical support from the Global Environment
Facility ("GEF") and the new Clean Development Mechanism
("CDM"). 8 1 The Protocol did not, however, require the developing
countries to set binding reduction targets.
8 2
Viewed as a first step, the Protocol set the timeframe of the First
Commitment Period from 2008 to 2012.83 Rather than specifying an
absolute cap on emissions for each country, the Protocol set targets
based on historical distributions of emissions.8 4 Each country with ob-
ligations negotiated its target, expressed as a percent reduction below
77. S. Res. 312, 109th Cong. (2006).
78. See Figure 1 supra Part I.B.
79. See UNFCCC, A Summary of the Kyoto Protocol [hereinafter UNFCCC, Kyoto Pro-
tocol Online Summary], http://unfccc.int/kyoto-protocol/background/items/2879.php;
UNFCCC, CARING FOR CLIMATE, supra note 67.
80. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (entered into force Mar. 21, 2004) [hereinafter Kyoto Proto-
col], available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
81. UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol Online Summary, supra note 79.
82. See UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol Online Summary, supra note 79; UNFCCC, CARING
FOR CLIMATE, supra note 67.
83. See UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol Online Summary, supra note 79.
84. See id.
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the baseline year of 1990.85 However, given the timeframe of the
agreement, the Protocol did not set targets at levels necessary to stabi-
lize the climate; rather, the targets were based on each country's pro-
jections of what could be achieved during the timeframe.86
Unfortunately for the planet, the nation most responsible for global
warming-the United States-did not take responsibility for its share
of the problem and did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol.
3. Kyoto Mechanisms
In an effort to reach agreement on emission-reduction targets,
the Protocol incorporated several mechanisms to enable Annex I
countries to meet their commitments and to engage all countries in
addressing the climate change problem. First and foremost, actual
emission reductions in Annex I countries were the main mechanism
for meeting Protocol targets; the 2001 Marrakesh Accords affirmed
this.87 In addition, the Protocol established three "flexibility" mecha-
nisms for reducing costs and engaging developing countries: (1)
Emissions Trading ("ET"), (2) Joint Implementation ('JI"), and (3)
CDM. 88 With ratification of the Protocol, Annex I Parties can gain
credits through flexibility mechanisms to satisfy part of their emission-
reduction commitment. 89
ET is a mechanism available only to countries with binding
targets (the Annex I countries).90 The Protocol developed its now up-
and-running EU Emissions Trading System ("ETS") after tough nego-
tiations in Kyoto, and the program was launched rapidly when the
Protocol took effect in 2005. Economic analyses show that the costs of
meeting emission reduction targets can be reduced by allowing enti-
85. Each Annex I country negotiated a target, with the European Union ("EU") nego-
tiating as a group with the UN and negotiating within the EU for individual country com-
mitments. UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, Countries Included in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol
and Their Emission Targets, http://unfccc.int/kyoto-protocol/background/items/3145.
php (last visited on Sept. 11, 2007). For example, the United States negotiated a seven
percent reduction from 1990 levels by 2008-2012. Id. The Europeans pledged more, while
Japan, which already has the lowest energy intensity among industrialized nations, negoti-
ated a six percent reduction. Id.
86. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 80.
87. See UNFCC, Kyoto Protocol Online Summary, supra note 79; UNFCCC HAND-
BOOK, supra note 73; UNFCC, COP 1-11 DECISIONS, supra note 73; Table 2 supra Part II.A.1.
88. For further information about the so-called Kyoto Mechanisms, see UNFCCC,
Mechanisms Under the Kyoto Protocol: The Clean Development Mechanism, Joint Imple-
mentation and Emissions Trading, http://unfccc.int/kyoto-protocol/mechanisms/items/
1673.php (last visited Sept. 12, 2007) [hereinafter Kyoto Mechanisms].
89. See UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol Online Summary, supra note 79.
90. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 80, art. 17, 37 I.L.M. at 15.
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ties with low-cost reductions to do more, while allowing entities facing
high-cost reductions to pay the former to do more.91 The EU ETS is
too new to evaluate the savings and is still experiencing some wob-
bling as the carbon market and the system itself are being estab-
lished. 92 Because the United States has not ratified the Protocol,
United States entities cannot trade in the EU ETS or other trading
systems established under the Protocol.
The two other flexibility mechanisms under the Protocol aim to
engage other groups of countries, as well as reduce costs for countries
with commitments. Following an economic line of thought, emission
reductions in less-wealthy countries would likely be cheaper than in
the industrialized countries. At the same time, poorer countries could
benefit from an influx of technology and money. 93 JI is the mecha-
nism established for Economies In Transition ("EIT"), such as the for-
mer Soviet republics, while CDM is aimed at developing countries
such as China, India, and Brazil. 94 The Protocol established rather
strict review procedures to verify emission reductions undertaken
through these mechanisms; Annex I countries can ultimately use re-
duction credits to meet their emission-reduction targets. 9 5 Because
the United States has not ratified the Protocol, United States entities
cannot gain credits through CDM or JI.
One other important aspect of the Protocol and subsequent
agreements was the recognition of carbon sequestration as a means of
reducing atmospheric concentrations of C0 2 .96 Carbon sequestration
refers to removal of carbon from the atmosphere, for example by
plants or trees that take in CO 2 and incorporate the carbon into their
cell mass, thereby keeping the carbon out of the atmosphere. 9 7 Con-
versely, plants and trees release carbon into the atmosphere when
91. One useful reference on the economic arguments behind climate change policy is
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE (RFF), CLIMATE CHANGE ECONOMICS AND POLICY- AN RFF AN-
THOLOGY (Michael A. Toman ed., 2001).
92. The official website for the European Union Emission Trading Scheme ("EU
ETS") is http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission.htm (last visited Aug. 11,
2007). One helpful summary of the trading scheme is available from United Kingdom
Department for the Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs ("U.K. DEFRA") at http://www.
defra.gov.uk/ENVIRONMENT/climatechange/trading/eu/intro/index.htm (last visited
Aug. 11, 2007).
93. One useful reference on the economic arguments behind climate change policy is
RFF, supra note 91.
94. For further information, see Kyoto Mechanisms, supra note 88.
95. See id.
96. See, e.g., UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol Online Summary, supra note 79.
97. For more information, see Office of Science, U.S. Dept. of Energy, Carbon Se-
questration, http://cdiac2.esd.ornl.gov/index.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2007).
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they are removed or burned. The scientific understanding of biologi-
cal carbon sequestration is not as strong as our understanding of phys-
ical and chemical climate processes. Thus, the inclusion of carbon
sequestration-which involves biological removal of atmospheric CO 2
-as a recognized means of meeting Protocol emissions targets-
which focus on the human emissions of CO2 into the atmosphere-
met with much debate. However, estimates of the release of CO 2 from
agriculture and land-use changes indicate that carbon sequestration is
an important mechanism for mitigating climate change.
Figure 2 illustrates how carbon sequestration fits into the flow dia-
gram of human influence on the climate system. Figure 2 also illus-
trates another development in international climate discussion:
carbon capture and storage ("CCS"). CCS involves the removal of CO 2
mainly from fossil-fuel combustion, and ferreting away the CO 2 in un-
derground geological formations (as is done on a limited scale for
enhanced oil recovery) or possibly other not-yet-tried places like the
deep ocean. 98 The appeal of CCS is that use of fossil fuels could con-
Figure 2. Carbon Sequestration and Carbon Capture and
Storage in the Climate System
CONCENTRATION
Increased Greater heat trapping and global
of greenhouse TEMPERATURE
gases I INCREASE (AT)
CCS , I
(sea level rise, severe weather
(ENERGY, LAND USE) events, ecosystem disruption)
.... and MITIGATION ... and ADAPTATION to
Source: Author
98. For more information on CCS, see World Res. Inst., Carbon Capture and Seques-
tration (CCS), http://www.wri.org/climate/project-description2.cfm?pid=226 (last visited
Aug. 11, 2007).
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tinue. At the request of large coal-producing and consuming coun-
tries, the IPCC prepared a special report on CCS. 99
There are several serious concerns, however, about CCS: the cap-
ture is thermodynamically difficult; the stability and capacity of stor-
age options are not clear; a new and significantly large infrastructure
would be needed to transport captured CO 2 in a highly pressurized
state; and all the CCS efforts combined would not move us beyond
fossil fuels. Suggestions that captured CO 2 be injected into the deep
ocean are of even greater concern; aquatic life is already suffering
from ocean acidification due to higher atmospheric CO 2 concentra-
tions. 00 Thus, from a process view of the climate system, CCS is akin
to sweeping the problem under the rug rather than solving it at the
source.
4. Searching for a Post-Kyoto Framework
With the First Commitment Period (2008-2012) of the Protocol
quickly approaching, the international community is already looking
ahead to a post-Kyoto framework for addressing climate change. For-
mal negotiations on a new framework are expected to feature promi-
nently at COP13 in 2007.101 But the development of ideas for a future
framework began even as handshakes were made in Kyoto in 1997.102
Any new framework must address two key issues in order to stabi-
lize the climate: how to engage the world's largest emitters, notably
the United States and large developing countries like China and In-
dia; and how to establish effective long-term targets for those coun-
tries. After years of stalemate,10 3 there are now glimmers of change
99. See IPCC, SPECIAL REPORT ON CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE (Bert Metz et al. eds.,
2005), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/activity/srccs/SRCCS.pdf.
100. See, e.g., GERMAN ADVISORY ON GLOBAL CHANGE (WBGU), THE FUTURE OCEANS -
WARMING Up, RISING HIGH, TURNING SOUR: SPECIAL REPORT (2006), available at http://www.
wbgu.de/wbgu-sn2006-en.pdf.
101. For more information regarding COP13, see UNFCCC, United Nations Climate
Change Conference, 3-14 December, Nusa Dua, Bali, Indonesia (COP13 and CMP 3),
http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_13/items/4049.php (last visited Aug. 11, 2007).
102. See, e.g., PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, BEYOND KYOTO: ADVANCING
THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE (2003), available at http://www.
pewclimate.org/docUploads/Beyond%20Kyoto.pdf.
103. As one example of stalemate, COPII in Montreal in 2005 made only limited pro-
gress in even trying to discuss post-Kyoto. In Decision 1/CP.11, the United States delega-
tion agreed to dialogue about the future only under the condition that nothing really
come of it. UNFCCC, Dialogue, supra note 76. As a result, the language in the decision
reads: "Resolves to engage in a dialogue, without prejudice to any future negotiations, com-
mitments, process, framework or mandate under the Convention, to exchange experiences
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coming from processes outside the UNFCCC. These are discussed in
the following section.
B. Beyond the UN: Other International Responses
The UN climate negotiations have made important steps in creat-
ing the institutions to address climate change and working toward a
comprehensive international agreement. From a physical environ-
mental perspective, a comprehensive agreement is appealing because
it can effectively meet the physical bottom-line, i.e., sufficient reduc-
tions in greenhouse gas emissions to stabilize atmospheric concentra-
tions and avoid catastrophic climate change. From an international
environmental policy perspective, a comprehensive international
agreement is appealing because it avoids a number of policy pitfalls,
including free riders 0 4 and leakage.1 0 5
However, the progress made in controlling greenhouse gases
under current UN agreements is painfully slow and not yet sufficient.
Unlike the oft-hailed precedent of protecting the Earth's ozone
shield, which could be addressed by a comparatively narrow set of ac-
tions, 10 6 the climate change problem requires solutions across multi-
ple sectors and is deeply interwoven with the fabric of industrially-
based, energy-intensive economies. The pervasive nature of the prob-
lem means that many stakeholders must become involved, including
those at the source of the problem: fossil fuel-based industry. An
emerging view in the current international climate regime and in dis-
and analyze strategic approaches for long-term cooperative action to address climate
change ... ." Id.; see UNFCC, COP 1-11 DECISIONS, supra note 73.
104. The term "free riders" refers to those who benefit from a policy initiative without
being subject to its requirements.
105. The term "leakage" refers to the movement of business or other activity outside of
a regulated area.
106. The Montreal Protocol to protect the Earth's ozone layer in the upper atmos-
phere is frequently heralded as a success story of international environmental policy. See
U.N. Indus. Dev. Org. ("UNIDO"), The Montreal Protocol - A Success Story, http://www.
unido.org/en/doc/50444 (last visited Aug. 11, 2007). One of the reasons for success is
that a solution could be found by substituting the man-made chemicals (chlorofluoro-
carbons) that destroy the ozone layer. Id. Another reason for success is that the Protocol
targeted a relatively narrow set of industries and products, such as refrigerants, propellants,
fire retardants, and fumigants. See PENELOPE CANAN & NANCY REICHMAN, OZONE CONNEC-
TIONS: EXPERT NETWORKS IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE (2001) (analyzing the
institutional strengths and limitations of the Montreal Protocol); ELIZABETH R. DESOMBRE
&JOANNE KAUFFMAN, INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AID: PITFALLS AND PROMISE (Robert
0. Keohane & Marc A. Levy eds., 1996) (analyzing the financial implementation of the
Protocol); Jimin Zhao, The Multilateral Fund and China's Compliance With the Montreal Proto-
col, 11 THE JOURNAL OF ENWTL. DEV. 331, 331-34 (2002) (analyzing implementation in
developing countries).
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cussions of a post-Kyoto framework is that a single, comprehensive in-
ternational agreement with binding commitments may not be realized
in the near term.' 07
As an alternative, or as a stepping-stone to a single comprehen-
sive treaty, different groups of nations may commit themselves to dif-
ferent types of agreements and targets. Some have termed such an
approach an "orchestra of treaties." 08 Rather than focusing targets
primarily or exclusively on emissions-as in the Protocol-agree-
ments could focus on the underlying activities that cause emissions:
energy and land-use activities. 10 9 For example, nations could develop
targets for energy consumption in power generation, or the carbon
content of electric-power generation. Some individual nations and
states already have such targets, in the form of efficiency standards for
power generation, or in Renewable Portfolio Standards ("RPS") that
require a share of electric power be produced from renewable energy
like solar and wind.110 Targets could also focus on the amount of en-
ergy consumed per physical unit of production, such as the energy
needed to produce a ton of steel.1 1'
107. Based on personal communication with observers of international climate negoti-
ations over the past ten years. See Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev. ("IISD"), Earth Negotia-
tions Bulletin, http://www.iisd.ca (last visited Oct. 8, 2007), for detailed reporting on
climate and other international environmental negotiations.
108. Taishi Sugiyama et al., The Coalition for Climate Technology Scenario, in GOVERNING
CLIMATE: THE STRUGGLE FOR A GLOBAL FRAMEWORK BEYOND KYOTO 35 (Taishi Sugiyama ed.,
2005), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/climate-governing.pdf.
109. See Figure 1 supra Part I.
110. For further information on Renewable Portfolio Standards in the United States,
see Database of State Initiatives on Renewable Energy ("DSIRE"), http://www.dsireusa.org
(last visited Aug. 10, 2007).
111. This is termed physical energy intensity and is distinctly different from economic
energy intensity. Targets based on physical energy intensity can achieve real (physical) and
quantifiable reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, because less energy is being con-
sumed per unit of output. In contrast, economic energy intensity mixes a physical unit
(energy) with a socially constructed unit (money) and does not necessarily lead to any
physical reductions in energy consumption or greenhouse gas emissions. In fact, economic
energy intensity in many countries has declined over the past several years even as energy
consumption and greenhouse gas emissions have increased. This trend has been shown in
numerous publications and presentations and highlighted again by Working Group III of
the IPCC in the 2007 Fourth Assessment Report. IPCCC WG3, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS,
supra note 21, fig. SPM 2. In other words, an economic energy intensity target often masks
the physical reality and does not necessarily achieve needed reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions. In fact, the economic energy intensity target (and later carbon intensity target)
promoted by the United States Bush administration is actually worse than "business-as-
usual;" i.e., the administration's target would lead to more energy consumption and more
climate damages. Thus rather than a remedy, the administration's target proposes more
harm. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, "Emissions Intensity" - Pollution by Any Other Name?,
http://www.nrdc.org/globalWarming/fintensity.asp (last visited Sept. 12, 2007) (analyzing
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Recognizing that some nations may undertake different paths as
a prelude to, or parallel with, a post-Kyoto framework, the following
sections examine three initiatives: (1) the Group of 8 ("G8"), (2) the
Asia-Pacific Partnership, and (3) a collection of efforts to engage in-
dustrializing countries through development assistance.
1. Group of 8 Nations (G8)
The first notable action by the G8 on climate change came in
2005, when the G8 summit concluded with the Gleneagles Plan of
Action. 112 At the 2005 Summit, G8 leaders recognized that "climate
change is happening now, that human activity is contributing to it,
and that it could affect every part of the globe."'113 Despite this state-
ment and efforts by (then) Prime Minister Tony Blair to push for
commitments to specific actions, the 2005 G8 agreement did not con-
tain any timeline or measurable goals. 114 The G8 did, however, com-
mission analyses from the International Energy Agency ("IEA") and
the World Bank. The IEA's task was to examine, from a technological
perspective, how greenhouse gas reductions could be achieved.
1 5
The World Bank's task was to determine how G8 financial support
could be utilized to achieve necessary emission reductions.11 6 Both
groups issued reports in 2006.
Climate change again figured prominently on the G8 agenda at
the June 2007 summit in Heiligendamm, Germany. Germany's Chan-
cellor Angela Merkel (who holds presidency of the G8 in 2007) priori-
tized the issue, with the support of most G8 leaders including British
Prime Minister Tony Blair.117 In advance of the 2007 meeting and
with an eye ahead to the 2008 G8 meeting in Tokyo, Japan announced
a proposal for a post-Kyoto climate agreement, with the goal of cut-
intensity targets); see also Nat'l Ctr. for Energy Policy ("NCEP"), Energy Commission Pro-
poses Plan to Cut Total U.S. Climate Emissions in First Year of Program (Apr. 19, 2007),
http://www.energycommission.org/site/page.php?pressrelease=18 (providing new recom-
mendations which move away from intensity targets).
112. G8 GLENEAGLES, PLAN OF ACTION: CLIMATE CHANGE, CLEAN ENERGY AND SUSTAINA-
BLE DEVELOPMENT (2005), available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/PostG8-
Gleneagles_.CCChangePlanofAction.pdf.
113. G8 Climate Plan of Action Delivers Little Change, EN r-L. NEWS SERV., July 8, 2005,
http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/jul2005/2005-0 7 -08-02.asp.
114. See id.
115. INT'L ENERGY AGENCY ("lEA"), ENERGY TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVES (2006).
116. WORLD BANK, AN INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK FOR CLEAN ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT
(2006).
117. Richard Black, U.S. Seeks G8 Climate Text Changes, BBC NEWS, May 14, 2007, http:/
/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/6651295.stm.
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ting current greenhouse gas emissions in half by 2050.118 Japan also
offered a specific proposal for near-term climate action at the May
2007 meeting of energy ministers under Asia-Pacific Economic Coop-
eration ("APEC"), calling on APEC nations to work with lEA on sec-
tor-specific energy-efficiency targets. 1 9 The 2007 summit closed with a
resolution to reach agreement on a post-Kyoto framework by 2009.120
The Bush administration, however, seemed to continue its efforts
to evade and distract from real action on climate change. Roughly one
month before the 2007 G8 meeting, the United States sought to strike
language from draft meeting documents that stated: "climate change
is speeding up and will seriously damage our common natural envi-
ronment and severely weaken [the] global economy .... [R]esolute
action is urgently needed in order to reduce global greenhouse gas
emissions."1 21 Just days before the G8 meeting, President Bush an-
nounced a new proposal to hold separate climate talks with the G8
plus seven nations.122 Most world leaders met the Bush administra-
tion's latest proposal with skepticism, but some met it with open-
ness. 123 The Executive Secretary of UNFCCC, Yvo de Boer, welcomed
United States engagement-after the White House offered the prom-
ise that their talks would feed into the UN process rather than derail
it.124 However, the Executive Secretary noted that the United States
proposal would not be productive unless it addressed three missing
elements: (1) assistance for the sustainable development of poor na-
tions; (2) enhancement of international carbon markets; and (3) sup-
port for the UNFCCC principle of industrialized nations' obligations
to take the lead in combating climate change.' 25 Others remained
skeptical, noting past United States efforts to bypass UN negotiations
118. Joseph Coleman, Japan Proposes Halving Emissions by 2050, WASH. POST, May 24,
2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/24/
AR2007052400547.html.
119. Shigeru Sato, Japan Will Urge APEC to Take Energy-Saving Measures (Updatel),
BLOOMBERG.COM, May 28, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601101&
sid=AWNYkfb5wCq4&refer=-Japan#.
120. Press Release, UNFCCC, G8 Document Re-energises Multilateral Climate Change
Process Under the United Nations (June 7, 2007), http://unfccc.int/files/press/
news room/pressreleases andadvisories/application/pdf/20070607_g8_pressrelease_
english.pdf.
121. Black, supra note 117.
122. Roger Harrabin, UN. Welcomes Bush's Climate Plans, BBC NEWS, June 1, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/6713543.stm.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id.
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by establishing an alternative venue for climate efforts, namely the
Asia-Pacific Partnership.1 26
2. Asia-Pacific Partnership
Launched in January 2006 by the United States, just after the Pro-
tocol entered into force, the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Devel-
opment and Climate ("APP") functions outside the UN process and
focuses on energy-technology cooperation rather than emissions
targets. 127 The APP established eight public-private task forces for en-
ergy-intensive sectors: (1) Aluminum; (2) Buildings and Appliances;
(3) Cement; (4) Cleaner Use of Fossil Energy (emphasis on carbon
capture & storage); (5) Coal Mining; (6) Power Generation and
Transmission; (7) Renewable Energy and Distributed Generation; and
(8) Steel.1 28 There are varying levels of participation by the six mem-
ber countries in the different task forces, as well as varying levels of
activity. For example, one sub-group within the Power Generation and
Transmission Task Force has recently held study tours for engineers
from all six countries to share experiences with maximizing efficiency
in existing power plants.1 29 The Cement Task Force has had some
concrete activities,1 30 and the Steel Sector Task Force is forging ahead
as well.'31
APP brings together a small group of large greenhouse gas emit-
ters, engaging both developed and developing countries: the United
States, Japan, and Australia, along with China, India, and the Republic
of Korea.13 2 These countries hold roughly half the world's population
and cause roughly half of global greenhouse gas emissions. Real ac-
tion on energy by this group of key nations-especially the United
States and China-is essential for addressing the climate change prob-
lem. It is still too early to tell if APP will become an important group
126. See id.
127. For commentary on the APP, as well as climate response in China, see Jeffrey
Logan et al., For China, the Shift to Climate-Friendly Energy Depends on International Collabora-
tion, BOSTON REV. (2007), http://www.pewclimate.org/press-room/discussions/jlboston
review.cfm.
128. For further information about the Asia-Pacific Partnership, see Asia-Pac. Partner-
ship on Clean Dev. & Climate, http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org (last visited Aug. 11,
2007).
129. Personal Interview with Japanese Members, APP Power Generation and Transmis-
sion Task Force, in Tokyo, Japan (June 2007).
130. The pun on "concrete" action comes from a Cement Task Force member.
131. Personal Interview with Japanese Members, APP Steel Sector Task Force, in To-
kyo, Japan (June 2007).
132. See Asia-Pac. Partnership on Clean Dev. & Climate, supra note 128.
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for climate action, or a diversion from UN climate change negotia-
tions and commitments.
3. Development Cooperation on Energy and Climate
Industrializing countries do not yet have emission-reduction obli-
gations under the UN climate agreements. But many are undertaking
initiatives to slow greenhouse gas emissions and to adapt to increasing
impacts of climate change. International support for developing coun-
try initiatives can come from GEF, established in 1991, as well as from
other sources of development aid and technical assistance.1
3 3
Large and small donors-including the United Nations Develop-
ment Program ("UNDP"), the World Bank, the Asian Development
Bank ("ADB"), the EU, and bilateral donors-have launched a host of
programs on energy efficiency, renewable energy, and the develop-
ment of overarching climate strategies.1 34 For example, the UNDP is
working with China through its End-Use Energy Efficiency Pro-
gramme, using GEF funds. 135 The UNDP Programme in China coor-
dinates initiatives in several energy-intensive sectors, including the
development of energy efficient requirements for new industrial facili-
ties, formulating targets and action plans (voluntary agreements) for
industrial energy conservation, and implementing energy-efficiency
standards and labeling for electric appliances and building materi-
als. 136 This and other international cooperation efforts seek to sup-
port each country's domestic climate initiatives.
The EU, Japan, and other industrialized countries have pushed
ahead with their own climate initiatives under UNFCCC, and they
have supported developing-country activities as well. In contrast, the
United States-at the federal level and in foreign policy-has used
the lack of developing country commitments under UNFCCC as an
excuse for limiting action.13 7 The following viewpoint from Rajendra
133. For more information about GEF, see Global Env't Facility, About the GEF, http:/
/www.gefweb.org/interior.aspx?id=50#id=18430 (last visited Aug. 11, 2007).
134. Stephanie Ohshita et al., Cooperation Structure: The Growing Role of Independent Coop-
eration Networks, in COOPERATIVE CLIMATE: ENERGY EFFICIENCY ACTION IN EAST AsIA 39
(Taishi Sugiyama & Stephanie Ohshita eds., 2006), available at http://www.iisd.org/
publications/pub.aspx?pno=805.
135. See id. at 45.
136. See id. at 48-49.
137. In numerous statements from the White House and the State Department, the
Bush administration has disregarded the UNFCCC agreement on industrialized countries
taking the lead on climate change. Instead, the administration-along with some members
of Congress-has stalled United States action, saying the United States should not take on
binding commitments unless the developing countries do. See Table 2 supra Part II.A.1.
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Pachauri, President of India's Tata Energy Research and Chair of the
IPCC, conveyed a shared sentiment from many developing countries
when he explained that "though India, like other developing coun-
tries, has not taken specific commitments to mitigate CO 2 emissions, it
is making progress in this direction" through energy-price reform, en-
ergy-sector deregulation, and promotion of energy efficiency and re-
newable energy. 138 He also commented that the United States'
"demands for developing-country commitments willfully ignore these
signs of progress."1 3
9
C. International Comparison of Contributions to Climate Change
This section presents an international comparison of greenhouse
gas emitters and highlights the two countries bearing the largest share
of the problem: the United States and China. At the time of writing
this Article, several media outlets announced that China had sur-
passed the United States as the world's largest emitter. 140 However,
climate change is a cumulative problem-CO2 lingers for hundreds of
years-and cumulatively the United States has still caused the largest
share of the problem. 4
1
Figure 3 compares CO 2 emissions (in terms of million tons of car-
bon equivalent) among selected countries in 1990 and 2000, high-
lighting the large emitters and countries in the rapidly-growing Asian
region. 142 The figure shows that the largest emitter during the period,
However, recognizing the need for all countries to take action, some United States govern-
ment agencies have continued to cooperate with developing countries on climate and en-
ergy initiatives, despite the White House stance.
138. Seth Dunn, Reading The Weathervane: Climate Policy From Rio to Johannesburg
(WorldWatch, Working Paper No. 160, Jane Petersen ed., 2002).
139. Id.
140. The announcement about China's new status as the world's largest carbon emitter
came from a Dutch agency and was carried by many news venues. See, e.g., John Vidal &
David Adam, China Overtakes U.S. As World's Biggest C0 2 Emitter, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, June
19, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/china/story/0,,2106687,00.html.
141. See Dunn, supra note 138.
142. The following discussion is based on my analysis of data from the United States
EIA. The 1990 data for Germany are the combined data for East and West Germany. The
1992 data for Russia are used here since 1990 data are only available for the Former Soviet
Union as a whole. The two EIA data sources are (1) EIA, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, INTERNA-
TIONAL ENERGY ANNUAL 2001 (2001); and (2) EIA, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, INTERNATIONAL
ENERGY OUTLOOK 2003 (2003). For current 2007 reports, see EIA, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2007 (2007), http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/pdf/
0484(2007).pdf. See also EIA, U.S. Dept. of Energy, International Energy Annual (IEA),
http://www.eia.doe.gov/iea/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2007); EIA, U.S. Dep't of Energy, Inter-
national Energy and Data Analysis, http://www.eia.doe.gov/international/ (last visited
Aug. 11, 2007) (breaking down different energy sectors).
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the United States, held its lead by a large margin. China was the
world's second largest generator of CO 2 emissions in the year 2000,
accounting for 12.1% of the world total. Japan and India accounted
for 4.8% and 3.9%, respectively.' 43 The entire Asian region still emit-
ted less than the United States, which single-handedly accounted for
24.5% of the world total. 144 While Germany and Russia were able to
decrease emissions during the past decade, other countries increased
emissions. Despite its Protocol target of a six percent reduction of
1990 emissions, Japan increased by fifteen percent, while the United
States increased by sixteen percent.1 4 5 The increases were most dra-
matic in the Asian region, with CO 2 emissions from India growing
sixty-one percent, South Korea eighty-two percent, and Indonesia
eighty-one percent. 1 46 China's emissions grew by twenty-seven percent
during the 1990-2000 decade, but the increase was lower than
expected. 147
The situation in China changed dramatically with a surge in Chi-
nese power-plant construction, steel production, and cement produc-
tion in the new millennium.1 48 Since 2003, energy consumption in
China has increased more rapidly than economic growth, resulting in
an energy intensity above one.1 4 9 Even as China has launched energy-
conservation programs for industry, transportation, and other sectors,
incredible growth in the steel and cement sectors has created large
demand for coal and electricity. 150 Nearly sixty GW of new capacity
were installed in 2005 alone and the majority of it coal-fired. 15 1 Based
143. Since the CO 2 emissions data are based directly on fossil fuel use, they mirror
energy consumption and reflect fuel choices. The rank order of countries based on CO2
emissions is nearly identical to the rank order based on energy. Germany and India switch
places due to India's greater use of coal (a high-carbon fuel) and Germany's greater use of
natural gas and renewable energy (low- and no-carbon fuels). Since coal yields more CO 2
emissions than natural gas or renewables per unit of energy, India has higher CO 2 emis-
sions relative to its energy consumption than does Germany.
144. See supra text accompanying note 142.
145. See Dunn, supra note 138.
146. See supra text accompanying note 142.
147. SeeJEFFREY LOGAN, PAC. Nw. NAT'L LAB., A N UPDATE ON RECENT ENERGY AND CAR-
BON DIOXIDE TRENDS IN CHINA (2001), available at http://www.pnl.gov/aisu/pubs/
engenvup.pdf.
148. For detailed Chinese energy statistics in English, see LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT'L
LAB. ("LBNL"), CHINA ENERGY DATABOOK (6th ed. 2004).
149. JONATHAN SINTON ET AL., LBNL, EVALUATION OF CHINA'S ENERGY STRATEGY OP-
TIONS (2005), available at http://china.lbl.gov/publications/nesp.pdf.
150. See Xie Ye, Chzna: Energy conservation to top government agenda, CHINA DAILY, July 4,
2004, http://www.energybulletin.net/905.html.
151. Different figures have been reported for new power generation capacity in China
in 2005 and 2006. For example, researchers at Stanford University estimate the addition of
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on this, projections that China will surpass the United States in CO2
emissions were revised from 2020 to as soon as 2008.152
Even with the June 2007 announcement of China surpassing the
United States, 153 we should recognize that China's energy consump-
tion-along with statistics measuring its energy consumption-fluctu-
ates, sometimes significantly. Analysts have long been pondering
upswings and downturns in Chinese energy consumption. 154 The pre-
sent increases in energy and CO 2 emissions are significant, but it re-
mains unclear how long the current surge will continue.
Notwithstanding the significance of Asia's greenhouse gas emis-
sions in terms of the total amount emitted, other perspectives on time
and place yield substantially different views. If one considers the cu-
mulative burden of human-generated CO 2 during the past century,
China contributed seven percent while the United States contributed
thirty percent of the world total. 155 From an equity perspective, the
contrast is even more striking. The Asian region is home to nearly half
of humanity, with the populations of China and India each surpassing
the one billion mark. Figure 4 shows carbon emissions on a per capita
basis for the same group of countries depicted in the previous fig-
ure. 156 The people of Asian nations generate significantly less CO2
than do Americans or citizens of other industrialized countries. Japan
has the lowest per capita carbon emissions of the industrialized
group. 157 In the year 2000, Americans emitted five times the global
average, ten times more than the Chinese, and nineteen times more
than the citizens of India.1 58 The per capita gap between Americans
and Chinese has narrowed since the turn of the new century, now
roughly a four-fold difference, but still remains significant.159 This in-
sixty to seventy GW. See Civic EXCH., ENERGY FORUM SUMMARY REPORT (2006), available at
http://www.civic-exchange.org/publications/2006/EnergyForum.pdf; see also Stanford
University, Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, http://pesd.stanford.edu
(last visited Aug. 11, 2007).
152. See lEA, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2006 (2006) [hereinafter IEA, WORLD ENERGY
OUTLOOK].
153. See Vidal & Adam, supra note 140.
154. SeeJonathan Sinton & David Fridley, What Goes Up: Recent Trends in China's Energy
Consumption, 28 ENERGY POLIcY 671-87 (2000).
155. See Dunn, supra note 138.
156. See supra text accompanying note 142.
157. See Figure 4 infra Part II.C.
158. See supra text accompanying note 142.
159. Based on 2006 BP energy data. See Neth. Envtl. Assessment Agency, China Now
No. I in C02 Emissions; USA in Second Position, http://www.mnp.nl/en/dossiers/
Climatechange/moreinfo/Chinanownol inCO2emissionsUSAinsecondposition.html (last
visited Aug. 11, 2007) (comparing the factors influencing each country's CO2 emissions).
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equity, as seen from the developing countries' perspective, has been
one of the major stumbling blocks in international climate change
negotiations.
Figure 3. Country Comparison of CO 2 Emissions (1990 and
2000)
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Source: Ohshita analysis of EIA data, supra note 138. Mtce = million metric tons carbon
equivalent.
Figure 4. Per Capita Country Comparison of CO2 Emissions
(1990 and 2000)
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III. Solutions and Conclusions
A. Multiple Solutions Needed to Achieve Necessary Emission
Reductions
As Pacala and Socolow have visualized with the concept of climate
stabilization "wedges," we need a combination of solutions to cut
worldwide emissions of greenhouse gases-there is no silver bullet. 160
Past and present reports by Working Group III of the IPCC on mitiga-
tion of climate change also highlight the need for a multi-pronged
strategy of emission reductions.
1 6 1
Two important reports released by the IEA in 2006 highlight the
importance of energy efficiency-especially in transportation and use
of electricity-in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Both reports
placed heavy emphasis on the climate-change implications of energy
use among the world's largest consumers, notably the United States
and China. The IEA World Energy Outlook 2006 examined an Alterna-
tive Policy Scenario to curb human emissions of greenhouse gases-
primarily CO 2-by 2030.162 In that scenario, policies promoting more
efficient production and use of energy could realize almost eighty per-
cent of avoided CO 2 emissions worldwide. Of that large savings, nearly
thirty-six percent comes from more efficient use of fuels in cars and
trucks. 163 More efficient use of electricity in appliances, lighting, cool-
ing, and industrial motors contributes another thirty percent. 164 Bet-
ter efficiency in electric-power generation and other energy
production accounts for thirteen percent. 165
In Energy Technology Perspectives, IEA provides technology analysis
and strategies for climate change mitigation in response to the re-
quest by the G8 after the Gleneagles Summit in 2005.166 IEA devel-
oped accelerated technology scenarios for cutting future CO 2
emissions in half by 2050.167 Even with the introduction of new tech-
160. S. Pacala & R. Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 50
Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCIENCE 968-72 (2004).
161. See, e.g., IPCC WG3, SUtMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 21. For a list of earlier
assessments reports from IPCC Working Group III (Mitigation), see IPCC, Publications,
Online reports, http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/online.htm (last visited Aug. 11, 2007).
162. See IEA, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK, supra note 152. The Alternative Policy Scenario
would yield a sixteen percent reduction in CO 2 emissions by 2030, compared to 2004. Id.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See lEA, ENERGY TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVES: SCENARIOS & STRATEGIES TO 2050
(2006).
167. See id.
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nologies a few decades from now, such as carbon capture and storage,
the largest share of CO2 reductions would still come from end-use en-
ergy efficiency, through the accelerated introduction of commercially-
available energy-efficient technologies. 168
Both IEA reports highlighted the economic favorability of mak-
ing energy-efficiency investments sooner rather than later. Invest-
ments in energy efficiency are typically less than the cost of new
energy supply. The IEA compared payback periods for investments in
energy-efficiency policies and technologies over two timeframes:
2005-2015 and 2016-2030.169 The estimates indicate that the payback
period for developing countries such as China would be roughly one
to two years for efficiency efforts made before 2015; in the timeframe
beyond 2015, the payback period would more than double. 70
In other words, the latest IEA reports reinforce what those work-
ing on energy and development have been emphasizing for years: the
energy and environmental savings from efficiency improvements are
huge, and the economic savings are higher when countries invest in
efficient technology early on.
More often than news of energy efficiency, the press highlights
possible future applications of cleaner coal technologies and nuclear
power for energy supply. For countries with a heavy reliance on coal
(like the United States and China), switching to low-carbon fuels (e.g.,
from coal to natural gas) and to zero-carbon energy (e.g., to wind and
solar) is indeed necessary. These countries may also need to begin
sequestering carbon from coal combustion in geological formations
and trees. However, energy efficiency has immediate appeal in that
technologies are already commercially available which meet local pri-
orities along with global climate needs. In addition, energy efficiency
has long-term appeal as well, because it sets more sustainable eco-
nomic and technological paths in motion.
A. Conclusion: Moving Forward with Solutions
This broad sweep across the scientific and international context
for United States initiatives on climate change concludes by reiterat-
ing three main points. First, there is an overwhelming consensus and
scientific certainty on climate change. Arguments against action that
are based on the claim of scientific uncertainty simply do not hold.
168. See id.
169. IEA, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK, supra note 152.
170. See id.
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The phenomenon is real, and the understanding of the causes and
outcomes is increasingly sophisticated.
Second, multiple solutions are needed to stabilize the climate,
and those solutions must address the source of the problem to be ef-
fective. Multiple solutions are needed at all levels, from international
climate initiatives, to United States initiatives at the federal, state, and
local level. Solving at the source of the problem means managing en-
ergy demand through energy efficiency and conservation. Solving at
the source also means cutting carbon in energy supply, by shifting to
renewable energy and other no- or low-carbon energy sources.
To be effective, climate solutions must also consider the whole
system. In dealing with past environmental problems, from water pol-
lution to acid rain, we discovered that dilution was not the solution to
pollution. We also learned that end-of-pipe technological fixes did not
solve the problems; the most harmful particulate matter from combus-
tion is not controlled by our technological advances. 17' And our cur-
rent geo-engineering experiment of rapidly injecting massive amounts
of carbon into the atmosphere is not going very well.
Third, action is needed immediately. Postponing state action be-
cause of the lack of federal policy does not make the problem of cli-
mate change go away, nor does finger pointing at other sectors or
other countries. Analyses presented in this Article show that delay will
only increase the damages and their costs.
A final example illustrates the costs of stalling when faced with
environmental problems. Efforts in the 1970s to reduce smog and en-
hance domestic energy security led to requirements for technological
change in automobiles, notably catalytic converters and measures to
raise fuel efficiency. During that time, United States automobile man-
ufacturers fought regulation and denied that technological solutions
could be implemented. Japanese automakers, in contrast, saw an op-
portunity for gaining market share and took the road of innovation.
The lesson is still well-remembered by Japanese industry and regula-
tors: environmental challenges present a business opportunity. 72
United States automakers are now facing a remarkably similar situa-
tion with climate change. The global automobile market is growing
171. Small particulate matter, with a diameter of less than 5 microns (<PM5), is the
most damaging because it penetrates furthest into the lungs. For more information, see
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Frequent Questions, http://www.epa.gov/pm
designations/faq.htm#0 (last visited Aug. 11, 2007). But most industrial control equipment
is not guaranteed for particulates smaller than 2.5 microns. ld.
172. Based on personal communications with Japanese regulators and industry over
the past decade.
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most rapidly in China, and market shares will be determined in part
by automakers' ability to meet stricter Chinese standards for fuel
economy (as well as other pollutant emissions). United States
automakers are not well poised to flourish in the Chinese market. 73
Will the industry be narrowly clever in its litigation efforts to stall tech-
nological change? Or will it be truly clever in seizing an opportunity
for sustainable business? Let us hope that United States automakers
and other emitters take the road thus far less traveled.
173. See AMANDA SAUER & FRED WELLINGTON, WORLD RES. INST., TAKING THE HIGH
(FUEL ECONOMY) ROAD: WHAT DO THE NEW CHINESE FUEL ECONOMY STANDARDS MEAN FOR
FOREIGN AUTOMAKERS? (2004), available at http://pdf.wri.org/china the-high-road.pdf.
For a more recent report on the competitive position of world automakers in a cleaner
energy future see, The Drive for Low Emissions, ECONOMIST May 31, 2007, at 27.
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